Territorial Sovereignty and the Evolving Boumediene Factors: Al Maqaleh v. Gates and the Future of Detainee Habeas Corpus Rights by Nelson, Luke R.
The University of New Hampshire Law Review
Volume 9
Number 2 University of New Hampshire Law Review Article 9
March 2011
Territorial Sovereignty and the Evolving
Boumediene Factors: Al Maqaleh v. Gates and the
Future of Detainee Habeas Corpus Rights
Luke R. Nelson
University of New Hampshire School of La
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/unh_lr
Part of the Law Commons, and the Terrorism Studies Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – School of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars'
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The University of New Hampshire Law Review by an authorized editor of University of New
Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact ellen.phillips@law.unh.edu.
Repository Citation
Luke R. Nelson, Territorial Sovereignty and the Evolving Boumediene Factors: Al Maqaleh v. Gates and the Future of Detainee Habeas
Corpus Rights, 9 U.N.H. L. REV. 297 (2011), available at http://scholars.unh.edu/unh_lr/vol9/iss2/9
File: Nelson - Vol. 9, Iss. 2, V2 (updated; use this doc) Created on: 3/16/2011 9:38:00 PM Last Printed: 3/21/2011 10:19:00 AM 
297 
Territorial Sovereignty and the Evolving Boumediene 
Factors: Al Maqaleh v. Gates and the Future of Detainee 
Habeas Corpus Rights 
LUKE R. NELSON∗ 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 298 
II.  BACKGROUND: FROM EISENTRAGER TO BOUMEDIENE ................ 299 
A. Johnson v. Eisentrager ......................................................... 300 
B. Rasul v. Bush ....................................................................... 303 
C. Boumediene v. Bush ............................................................ 305 
III. AL MAQALEH V. GATES AND THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF 
THE  SUSPENSION CLAUSE TO BAGRAM DETAINEES .................. 307 
      A.  The D.C. District Court ...................................................... 307 
B.  The D.C. Circuit ................................................................. 310 
IV. ANALYSIS .................................................................................. 311 
A. What is Left of Territorial Sovereignty in Today’s Habeas 
Corpus Analysis? ................................................................. 311 
 1. Changing Definition of Sovereignty ................................. 312 
 2. Multiple Factors Beyond Territorial Sovereignty ............ 315 
B. The Future of the Habeas Factors: Additional Factors and 
Unanswered Questions ........................................................ 317 
 1. Additional Factors in Response to Today’s Conflicts ...... 317 
 a. Length of Confinement Without Adequate Status 
Review………….……………………………………...318 
 b. Executive Manipulation ................................................. 319 
 2. Unanswered Questions ..................................................... 320 
C. Guidance on the Practical Obstacles .................................. 322 
V.  CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 324 
  
 ∗  B.A., University of Minnesota Duluth, 2007; J.D. Candidate, University of 
New Hampshire School of Law, 2011.  The author thanks Alice Briggs and Tom 
Sanchez for their thoughtful edits and comments to this Note. 
File: Nelson - Vol. 9, Iss. 2, V2 (updated; use this doc) Created on:  3/16/2011 9:38:00 PM Last Printed: 3/21/2011 10:19:00 AM 
298    UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 9, No. 2 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In November 2010, the U.S. government prosecuted in a civilian 
federal court an accused terrorist detainee housed since 2004 at the 
Guantanamo Bay Detention Center (Guantanamo Bay).1  The Ob-
ama Administration considered this trial a “test case” for prosecuting 
accused terrorist detainees in civilian federal courts.2  Of the more 
than 280 charges against the detainee defendant, a civilian jury con-
victed him of one count and acquitted him of the remaining charges.3  
Yet, the defendant received a life sentence without parole.4 
This “test case” is one example of a changing landscape in inter-
national armed conflict and detainee rights jurisprudence following 
September 11, 2001.  This Note discusses one area of American con-
stitutional law that has clearly evolved in recent detainee rights liti-
gation: the extraterritorial reach of the Suspension Clause and exten-
sion of habeas corpus rights to detainees held beyond U.S. sovereign 
territory.5 
Historically, territorial sovereignty determined the extraterritorial 
reach of the Suspension Clause.6  In 2008, however, Boumediene v. 
Bush7 greatly impacted the role of territorial sovereignty in extrater-
ritorial habeas jurisprudence.  In Boumediene, the Supreme Court 
developed a practical, multi-factor test for determining the reach of 
the Suspension Clause while holding that federal courts were not 
  
 1. Benjamin Weiser, Detainee Acquitted on Most Counts in ’98 Bombings, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/nyregion/ 
18ghailani.html?_r=1. 
 2. Id.  The significance of this case is demonstrated by the trial judge’s finding 
that the defendant’s “status of ‘enemy combatant’ probably would permit his de-
tention as something akin ‘to a prisoner of war until hostilities between the United 
States and Al Qaeda and the Taliban end . . . .”  Id.; see also Benjamin Weiser, Ex-
Detainee Gets Life Sentence in Embassy Blasts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/nyregion/26ghailani.html?_r=1&partner=rss
&emc=rss. 
 3. Weiser, supra note 2. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see also infra Part IV. 
 6. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950). 
 7. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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foreclosed from entertaining habeas petitions from Guantanamo Bay 
detainees.8  This was the first decision to allow detainee foreign na-
tionals held beyond U.S. sovereign territory to seek habeas corpus 
relief through the federal courts.9  Now that Guantanamo Bay has 
been addressed, recently, the focus has shifted to detainees held at 
the Bagram Theater Internment Facility (Bagram) in Afghanistan.10 
In May 2010, the D.C. Circuit in Al Maqaleh v. Gates11 held that 
the balance of Boumediene’s multi-factor test weighed against ex-
tending the Suspension Clause to four detainees captured beyond 
Afghanistan and detained at Bagram as unlawful enemy comba-
tants.12  By analyzing the development of the Boumediene multi-
factor test and focusing on its application to the Bagram detainees, 
this Note proposes that territorial sovereignty is no longer a control-
ling or driving factor in today’s extraterritorial habeas analysis.  Fur-
thermore, this Note provides a few practical recommendations for 
future applications of the Boumediene multi-factor test and addresses 
some unanswered questions in applying the test in future detainee 
cases. 
Part II provides a brief history of the extraterritorial habeas juri-
sprudence relating to foreign national detainees leading up to Al Ma-
qaleh.  Part III discusses the Al Maqaleh decisions in both the dis-
trict court and the court of appeals.  Part IV analyzes the declining 
role that territorial sovereignty plays in today’s habeas analysis.  Part 
IV also discusses various unanswered questions that await decision 
by the Supreme Court in applying the Boumediene test in future de-
tainee cases. 
II.  BACKGROUND: FROM EISENTRAGER TO BOUMEDIENE 
The Suspension Clause states: “The privilege of the Writ of Ha-
beas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebel-
  
 8. Id. at 766, 771. 
 9. Id. at 770. 
 10. See, e.g., Ari Shapiro, Is the Bagram Air Base the New Guantanamo?, NPR 
(Aug. 13, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=111855 
836. 
 11. 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Al Maqaleh II). 
 12. Id. at 99. 
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lion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”13  “Habeas Cor-
pus” means “that you have the body,” a mechanism allowing prison-
ers to challenge their government detention or confinement as un-
lawful.14  The writ of habeas corpus serves to protect individual con-
stitutional rights as well as ensure a separation of powers and a 
check on executive detention authority.15 
Little case law exists prior to 2004 discussing the extraterritorial 
reach of the Suspension Clause to foreign nationals detained beyond 
U.S. sovereign territory.  The leading case on the extraterritorial 
reach of the Suspension Clause is Johnson v. Eisentrager,16 decided 
in 1950.17 
A.  Johnson v. Eisentrager 
In Eisentrager, the U.S. government suspected twenty-one Ger-
man nationals, who were detained in China, of “continued military 
activity against the United States after surrender of Germany [in 
World War II].”18  All twenty-one nationals were prosecuted and 
convicted under military commissions and later sent to a German 
prison to serve their sentences.19  The detainees filed petitions in the 
D.C. District Court for habeas corpus relief, claiming that, although 
they were not U.S. citizens and had never stepped foot on U.S. sove-
reign territory, their convictions and imprisonments were unlawful.20 
The D.C. Circuit refused to dismiss the petitions, holding that 
“any person who is deprived of his liberty by officials of the United 
States, acting under purported authority of that Government, and 
who can show that his confinement is in violation of a prohibition of 
  
 13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 14. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004). 
 15. Tim J. Davis, Comment, Extraterritorial Application of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus After Boumediene: With Separation of Powers Comes Individual Rights, 
57 U. KAN. L. REV. 1199, 1204–05 (2009).  
 16. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 17. See Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 90 (stating that Eisentrager remained the 
governing precedent until 2004). 
 18. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 766. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 767–68. 
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the Constitution, has a right to the writ.”21  The Supreme Court in-
terpreted the D.C. Circuit’s ruling as suggesting that “any person, 
including an enemy alien, deprived of his liberty anywhere under 
any purported authority of the United States is entitled to the writ.”22  
The Supreme Court responded by reversing the D.C. Circuit’s judg-
ment and affirming the district court’s dismissal of the petitions.23 
In reversing the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court in Eisentrager 
arguably created a bright-line standard that defined the reach of the 
Suspension Clause as ending at the legal borders, or sovereign terri-
tory, of the United States.24  Holding that constitutional habeas cor-
pus relief does not extend to a foreign national engaged in war 
against the United States and detained abroad, the Supreme Court 
referenced the “inherent distinctions” between citizens and aliens.25  
The Court further noted that the constitutional provisions are “uni-
versal in their application, to all persons within the territorial juris-
diction”26 and that it is the “alien’s presence within its territorial ju-
risdiction that [gives] the Judiciary power to act.”27  In other words, 
the Suspension Clause did not reach beyond U.S. sovereign territory 
to individuals possessing little to no connection to the United States’ 
territory. 
On the other hand, the Eisentrager majority discussed various 
other factors beyond territorial sovereignty in reaching its decision, 
thus indicating that multiple practical and objective factors could 
determine the extraterritorial reach of the Suspension Clause.  The 
majority stated that when a foreign national “increases his identity 
  
 21. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev’d, 339 U.S. 
763 (1950) (emphasis added). 
 22. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 767 (emphasis added). 
 23. Id. at 791. 
 24. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 835 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
Justice Scalia stated that Eisentrager has always held “beyond any doubt” that 
“the Constitution does not ensure habeas for aliens held by the United States in 
areas over which our Government is not sovereign.”  Id.  The government’s main 
argument in Boumediene also reiterated the contention that “noncitizens designat-
ed as enemy combatants and detained in territory located outside our Nation’s 
borders have no constitutional right and no privilege of habeas corpus.”  Id. at 739.    
 25. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 768–69.  
 26. Id. at 771 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)). 
 27. Id. 
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with [American] society,” situations could arise allowing foreign 
national detainees to petition federal courts for habeas relief.28  The 
Court then listed various factors that required it to reject extending 
the Suspension Clause to the German nationals.29  Particularly, the 
German nationals failed to increase their identities with American 
society because each one: 
(a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the 
United States; (c) was captured outside of our territory and 
there held in military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was 
tried and convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside 
the United States; (e) for offenses against laws of war com-
mitted outside the United States; (f) and is at all times impri-
soned outside the United States.30  
Eisentrager became the driving precedent in determining wheth-
er constitutional habeas corpus protections extend to foreign nation-
als detained beyond U.S. sovereign territory.  This precedent would 
continue to control until 2003, when U.S.-led military operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan were initiated, drastically changing the entire 
nature of international armed conflict.31 
September 11, 2001 marked the beginning of a remarkable 
change in U.S. foreign policy and the state of international armed 
conflict.  Not only would the United States engage in armed conflicts 
in both Afghanistan and Iraq as a result of 9/11, but the post-9/11 era 
fittingly became known as a “Global War on Terrorism,” reflecting 
the global front to fighting the enemy and the lack identifiable ene-
my nations.32  As the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq escalated, 
  
 28. Id. at 770. 
 29. Id. at 777. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See, e.g., David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Methods of the “War on Ter-
ror,” 16 MINN. J. INTL. L. 371, 374–384 (2007) (discussing certain provisions of 
international law regulating today’s law of war).   
 32. See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 
20, 2001), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ 
news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (“Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, 
but it does not end there.  It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach 
has been found, stopped, and defeated.”); Guy Raz, Defining the War on Terror, 
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suspected “unlawful enemy combatants”33 were captured, trans-
ported, and detained in military prisons, most notably at Guantana-
mo Bay, located just ninety miles beyond U.S. sovereign territory.34  
Under Eisentrager and its progeny, the capture and detainment of 
foreign nationals as unlawful enemy combatants anywhere beyond 
U.S. sovereign territory was believed to restrict any successful at-
tempt by a foreign national at obtaining habeas corpus relief.  In fact, 
Bush Administration officials relied heavily on the Eisentrager 
precedent in deciding to hold accused terrorist detainees at Guanta-
namo Bay.35  Then, beginning in 2004, the Supreme Court addressed 
Eisentrager’s historical precedent. 
B.  Rasul v. Bush 
Within two years after enemy combatants were transported and 
detained at Guantanamo Bay, the Supreme Court, in Rasul v. Bush,36 
addressed whether foreign national detainees held beyond U.S. sove-
reign territory could seek habeas corpus relief, not under the Consti-
tution, but, under the federal habeas statute.37  Rasul involved two 
Australians and twelve Kuwaiti enemy combatants who challenged 
  
NPR (Nov. 1, 2006), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story 
Id=6416780. 
 33. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3, 120 Stat. 2600, 
2601 (2006) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1) (2006)) (defining “un-
lawful enemy combatant”). 
 34. Tung Yin, The Role of Article III Courts in the War on Terrorism, 13 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1061, 1080–81 (2005) (discussing reasons for transporting 
detainees to Guantanamo Bay).   
 35. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 828 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he President’s Office of Legal Counsel advised [the President] that the great 
weight of legal authority indicates that a federal district court could not properly 
exercise habeas jurisdiction over an alien detained at Guantanamo Bay.”) (internal 
quotation marks and brackets omitted); Edward F. Sherman, Terrorist Detainee 
Policies: Can the Constitutional and International Law Principles of the Boume-
diene Precedents Survive Political Pressures?, 19 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 207, 
208 (2010). 
 36. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 37. Id. at 470, 475; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2266 (2006).  The federal habeas 
statute at the time of Rasul authorized district courts, “within their respective ju-
risdictions,” to entertain habeas applications by persons claiming unlawful deten-
tion.  §§ 2241(a)(1) (emphasis added).    
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their detention at Guantanamo Bay as unlawful under the federal 
habeas statute.38  The Supreme Court interpreted the federal habeas 
statute as authorizing courts to entertain habeas petitions within their 
“respective jurisdictions,” indicating that a court’s jurisdiction is not 
limited to “sovereign territory,” but beyond that to “territorial juris-
dictions” where the U.S. government exercised significant control.39  
This interpretation authorized federal courts to entertain habeas peti-
tions under the federal habeas statute from detainees held at Guanta-
namo Bay.40  While making this determination, the Court noted the 
need for a flexible jurisdictional rule because the United States ex-
erted such large amounts of control over Guantanamo Bay.41  Al-
though the Court did not analyze Rasul under Eisentrager’s constitu-
tional habeas analysis, it still noted certain detainee characteristics 
that distinguished Eisentrager: 
[Petitioners] are not nationals of countries at war with the 
United States, and they deny that they have engaged in or 
plotted acts of aggression against the United States; they 
have never been afforded access to any tribunal, much less 
charged with and convicted of wrongdoing; and for more 
than two years they have been imprisoned in territory over 
which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and 
control.42 
Following Rasul, the Supreme Court engaged in a back-and-forth 
battle with Congress to define the federal courts’ ability to entertain 
petitions under the federal habeas statute by detainees held at Guan-
tanamo Bay.  First, Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005 (DTA), effectively stripping federal courts of jurisdiction to 
entertain habeas corpus petitions.43  Following the DTA, the Su-
preme Court, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,44 ruled that courts could enter-
  
 38. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470–71. 
 39. Id. at 481–82.  
 40. Id. at 484. 
 41. Id. at 478. 
 42. Id. at 476. 
 43. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005, 119 Stat. 
2739, 2742 (2005). 
 44. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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tain petitions filed before the DTA was enacted in 2005.45  In re-
sponse to Hamdan, Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act 
of 2006,46 which suspended any and all statutory petitions for habeas 
corpus relief by any detainee held after September 11, 2001.47  Now 
that federal courts were entirely stripped of any authority to entertain 
habeas petitions under the federal habeas statute, the question re-
mained whether habeas corpus protections under the Constitution 
could extend extraterritorially to foreign nationals at Guantanamo 
Bay and beyond. 
C.  Boumediene v. Bush 
Constitutional habeas corpus is considered a “privilege not to be 
withdrawn except in conformance with the Suspension Clause.”48  In 
2008, the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush revisited a constitu-
tional issue that the Eisentrager Court appeared to have already 
answered: “whether foreign nationals, apprehended and detained in 
distant counties during a time of serious threats to our Nation’s secu-
rity, may assert the privilege of the writ and seek its protection.”49  
Identifying constitutional habeas corpus as the “surest safeguard of 
liberty,”50 the Court ruled that detainees held beyond U.S. sovereign 
territory at Guantanamo Bay, who have never stepped foot within 
the United States and who have no connection with the United States 
other than capture by U.S. authorities, could invoke Suspension 
Clause protections and petition for habeas corpus relief in the federal 
courts.51 
By comparing and contrasting the facts in Boumediene to Eisen-
trager, the majority adopted an objective and practical three-factor 
balancing test to determine the extraterritorial reach of the Suspen-
sion Clause: 
  
 45. Id. at 575–77.  
 46. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 
2636 (2006) (amended 2009). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008). 
 49. Id. at 746. 
 50. Id. at 745. 
 51. Id. at 771. 
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[A]t least three factors are relevant in determining the reach 
of the Suspension Clause: (1) the citizenship and status of the 
detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that 
status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites 
where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) 
the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s en-
titlement to the writ.52 
Applying these three factors to the detainees held at Guantanamo 
Bay, the Court deviated from Eisentrager’s view that territorial so-
vereignty is the driving determination and reason for not extending 
constitutional habeas corpus protections beyond U.S. sovereign terri-
tory.  Under the first factor, the process afforded the detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay was considerably less than the process in Eisen-
trager.53   
Under the second factor, the degree of U.S. de facto sovereignty, 
or level of government control, over Guantanamo Bay since 1903, 
compared to the German prison in Eisentrager, drove the Court’s 
ruling that the Suspension Clause extends beyond simply U.S. de 
jure, or legal, sovereign territory.54  Thus, although the United States 
did not exercise de jure territorial sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay 
because the base sat beyond the U.S. legal border, it did maintain 
sufficient de facto sovereignty, or objective government control, 
over the base such that it weighed in favor of extending habeas cor-
pus protections to the detainees.55   
Under the third factor, few practical obstacles existed compared 
to post-World War II Germany because Guantanamo Bay sat beyond 
an active theater of war, and extending the Suspension Clause pro-
tections would have little effect on the military mission.56  Within 
two years of this decision, these practical Boumediene factors would 
  
 52. Id. at 766. 
 53. Id. at 766–67.  
 54. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 754–55, 768–69.  “De facto” means “existing in 
fact” or “having effect even though not formally or legally recognized.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 448 (8th ed. 2004).  “De jure” means “[e]xisting by right or 
according to law.”  Id. at 458. 
 55. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 754–55, 768–69.  
 56. Id. at 769–70.  
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be tested and applied to a detention facility halfway around the 
world: the Bagram Theater Internment Facility in Afghanistan. 
III.  AL MAQALEH V. GATES AND THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF 
THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE TO BAGRAM DETAINEES 
The Bagram Theater Internment Facility (Bagram) comprises a 
large, multi-nationally operated detention facility located in Afgha-
nistan.57  Upwards of 650 detainees are housed at Bagram, which the 
Republic of Afghanistan has maintained sovereignty over and leased 
to the United States and Coalition Forces for military purposes.58  
However, the United States possesses “complete jurisdiction and 
control” over Bagram and has the right to remain at Bagram as long 
as it desires.59 
Al Maqaleh is a unique case because, as the D.C. District Court 
recognized, it is the “first application of the multi-factor functional 
test crafted by the Supreme Court in Boumediene.”60  The case in-
volved four detainee petitioners held as unlawful enemy combatants 
at Bagram.61  Two detainees were confined since 2002 and a third 
since 2003.62  All four detainees were allegedly captured beyond 
Afghanistan in Pakistan, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates 
and later brought into the Afghanistan theater of war and confined at 
Bagram.63 
A.  The D.C. District Court 
Even after Boumediene, the government maintained that terri-
torial sovereignty should determine whether the Suspension Clause 
  
 57. See Marc D. Falkoff & Robert Knowles, Bagram, Boumediene, and Limited 
Government, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 851, 857 (2010). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 858. 
 60. Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh I), 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 207–08 (D.D.C. 
2009), rev’d, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 61. Id. at 209. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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extends to the Bagram detainees.64  Before discussing territorial so-
vereignty, however, the district court set the stage for its opinion by 
emphasizing that “petitioners have been in custody for six years with 
no definitive judicial determination as to the legality of their deten-
tion.”65  Recognizing that the only material difference between the 
Guantanamo Bay detainees and the Bagram detainees was the loca-
tion of confinement,66 the district court proceeded to apply Boume-
diene’s three-factor test to the Bagram detainees and hold that the 
Suspension Clause extended extraterritorially to Bagram.67  For the 
sake of analysis, the court divided the three Boumediene factors into 
six: 
(1) the citizenship of the detainee; (2) the status of the detai-
nee; (3) the adequacy of the process through which the status 
determination was made; (4) the nature of the site of appre-
hension; (5) the nature of the site of detention; and (6) the 
practical obstacles inherent in resolving the petitioner’s en-
titlement to the writ.68 
The district court then assigned the factors different weight by cha-
racterizing them as either “primary drivers” or factors deserving 
lesser weight in Boumediene’s multi-factor analysis.69  Assigned to 
the “primary drivers” group were the nature of the site of detention, 
the adequacy of process, and the practical obstacles.70  First applying 
the three factors of lesser weight, the court found that the Bagram 
detainees were similarly situated to the Guantanamo Bay detainees, 
as the Bagram detainees were not U.S. citizens, were labeled as 
  
 64. After President Obama took office in January 2009, the district court “invited 
[the government] to notify the Court whether they intended to refine the position 
they had taken to date” on the jurisdictional question.  Id. at 210.  In essence, the 
court asked the new Administration whether it would retain the Bush Administra-
tion’s argument that the right of habeas corpus does not extend to noncitizens be-
ing held beyond the United States’ sovereign territory.  The government responded 
that it “adheres to its previously articulated position.”  Id.    
 65. Id. at 208 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008)).  
 66. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d. at 214.   
 67. See id. at 215–225.   
 68. Id. at 215.  
 69. Id. at 218. 
 70. Id. 
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“enemy combatants,” and were apprehended beyond U.S. sovereign 
territory.71 
In applying the “primary drivers” group, the court first addressed 
the nature of the site of detention by examining the United States’ 
“objective degree of control” over Bagram.72  The court found that 
the United States maintained “near-total operational control” over 
Bagram, even though U.S. jurisdictional authority over Bagram was 
considerably less than the degree of control over Guantanamo Bay.73  
Noticeably absent from the site-of-detention analysis was territorial 
sovereignty; the entire analysis focused on the objective degree of 
U.S. government control over Bagram, up to and including the 
length of the property lease and future intention to remain at the 
base.74 
The application of the next “primary driver”—adequacy of the 
status determination process—required a comparison of the process 
afforded to the Bagram detainees to that afforded to the Guantanamo 
Bay detainees.75  Interestingly, while the Supreme Court found in 
Boumediene that the Combatant Status Review Tribunals at Guanta-
namo Bay were an inadequate process substitute for habeas corpus 
protections,76 the government in Al Maqaleh conceded that the Ba-
gram detainees’ status-determination process was even “less com-
prehensive” than the review tribunals at Guantanamo Bay.77  There-
fore, this factor weighed in favor of extending the Suspension Clause 
to the Bagram detainees. 
  
 71. Id. at 218–21. 
 72. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 222–23.  
 73. Id. at 222. 
 74. See id. at 222–23.  
 75. Id. at 226–27.  
 76. See Boumediene v. Gates, 553 U.S. 723, 767 (2008). 
 77. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 227.  The district court summarized the 
status determination process afforded to the Bagram detainees: 
Bagram detainees represent themselves.  Obvious obstacles, including 
language and cultural differences, obstruct effective self-representation 
by petitioners such as these.  Detainees cannot even speak for themselves; 
they are only permitted to submit a written statement.  But in submitting 
that statement, detainees do not know what evidence the United States re-
lies upon to justify an “enemy combatant” designation–so they lack a 
meaningful opportunity to rebut that evidence. 
Id. 
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The last “primary driver”—practical obstacles in extending the 
Suspension Clause to Bagram—considered various obstacles, in-
cluding the effect on the military mission, issues in evidence and fact 
gathering, and whether the detention site is located in an active thea-
ter of war.78  The court sympathized with the fact that Bagram was 
under constant threats of suicide bombers in the war theater, but em-
phasized that Bagram was under near-total U.S. control.79  The gov-
ernment stressed the practical difficulties in evidence and fact ga-
thering as well as providing counsel to detainees for habeas corpus 
hearings; this argument was quickly discounted, however, by focus-
ing on the technological advances since Eisentrager.80  Furthermore, 
the high degree of U.S. control over Bagram, along with the fact that 
the detainees were captured beyond Afghanistan and later transferred 
into the Afghanistan theater, discounted any concern that the site of 
detention was located in an active theater of war.81  Ultimately, after 
balancing these weighted factors, the court held that Bagram was no 
different from Guantanamo Bay, and, thus, the Suspension Clause 
and its protections must extend to the Bagram detainees.82 
B.  The D.C. Circuit 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit performed the same Boumediene 
analysis but reached a drastically different outcome.  The court be-
gan by sticking with Boumediene’s three-factor test rather than the 
district court’s six-factor test.83  As to the first factor, it agreed with 
the district court that the Bagram detainees were similarly situated to 
the Guantanamo Bay detainees and that they had received an inade-
quate process substitute.84 
  
 78. Id. at 227–30.  
 79. Id. at 228. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 230–31.  
 82. Id. at 231.  The court, however, ruled against extending the Suspension 
Clause protections to the Afghan detainee petitioner because of the inevitable 
practical obstacle when the Afghan government takes over custody of that detai-
nee.  See id.  
 83. Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d 84, 93–94 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 84. Id. at 96. 
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The application of second and third factors—the nature of the 
apprehension and detention sites and the practical obstacles in ex-
tending the Suspension Clause—illustrates a large analysis discon-
nect between the D.C. Circuit and the D.C. District Court.85  The 
second factor, according to the D.C. Circuit, weighed “heavily” in 
favor of not extending the Suspension Clause to Bagram for two rea-
sons.86  First, the detainees were captured abroad, so, under the 
second factor, the site of apprehension itself weighed against extend-
ing the Suspension Clause.87  Second, although the United States 
exerted some degree of control over Bagram and its military opera-
tions, the level of de facto sovereignty over Bagram—mainly the 
short lease and lack of intent to occupy the base indefinitely—simply 
did not compare to Guantanamo Bay, and, therefore, weighed 
against extending the Suspension Clause protections to Bagram.88  
The third factor weighed “overwhelmingly” in favor of not extend-
ing the Suspension Clause to Bagram, mainly because Afghanistan 
remains an active theater of war.89  Ultimately, after balancing the 
three factors, the D.C. Circuit reversed and refused to extend the 
Suspension Clause to the Bagram detainees because the second and 
third factors weighed so heavily against extending constitutional 
habeas protections in this case.90 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  What is Left of Territorial Sovereignty in Today’s Habeas Cor-
pus Analysis? 
The case law development from Eisentrager to Al Maqaleh illu-
strates an evolving standard in extraterritorial habeas jurisprudence.  
One factor certainly affected in this evolution is the role of territorial 
sovereignty.  Arguably, territorial sovereignty is no longer the driv-
ing habeas determination that the Eisentrager majority once envi-
  
 85. See id. at 96–98.  
 86. Id. at 96. 
 87. Id.   
 88. Id. at 97. 
 89. Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 97. 
 90. Id. at 98–99. 
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sioned.  The change from de jure to de facto sovereignty and the 
emerging consideration of fluid, more practical factors in the Bou-
mediene analysis creates an uncertain future for territorial sovereign-
ty at Bagram and future foreign detention sites. 
1.  Changing Definition of Sovereignty 
The recent change in focus from de jure to de facto sovereignty 
has greatly affected the role that territorial sovereignty will play in 
future detainee habeas cases.  Justice Jackson’s majority opinion in 
Eisentrager discussed the inherent significance of territorial sove-
reignty in determining the extraterritorial reach of the Suspension 
Clause: 
We are cited to no instance where a court, in this or any other 
country where the writ is known, has issued it on behalf of an 
alien enemy who, at no relevant time and in no stage of his 
captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction.  Nothing 
in the text of the Constitution extends such a right, nor does 
anything in our statutes.91 
Justice Jackson went on to state that “in extending constitutional pro-
tections beyond the citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point out 
that it was the alien’s presence within its territorial jurisdiction that 
gave the Judiciary power to act.”92 
Justice Jackson clearly indicated that de jure territorial sove-
reignty, as defined by the legal borders marking United States’ terri-
tory,93 is the driving factor determining the reach of the Suspension 
Clause.  In fact, the reason Bush Administration officials selected 
Guantanamo Bay to hold accused terrorist detainees was not a coin-
cidence: The Administration believed that Eisentrager’s precedent 
would put Guantanamo Bay beyond the reach of the law and the 
courts.94 
  
 91. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950). 
 92. Id. at 771. 
 93. For the definition of “territoriality,” see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1512 
(8th ed. 2004). 
 94. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 828 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting)  
(“[T]he President’s Office of Legal Counsel advised [the President] that the great 
weight of legal authority indicates that a federal district court could not properly 
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But then came Boumediene, where Justice Kennedy, writing for 
the majority, stressed the importance of analyzing the territoriality 
question not in a “narrow technical sense,” but as the “degree of con-
trol the military asserted over the facility.”95  Justice Kennedy went 
on to state that “[n]othing in Eisentrager says that de jure sovereign-
ty is or has ever been the only relevant consideration in determining 
the geographic reach of the Constitution or of habeas corpus.”96 
In any event, no longer will U.S. borders determine the reach of 
the Suspension Clause; rather, the determination will be made on a 
case-by-case basis after considering the degree of U.S. government 
control asserted over a particular facility or location.  Justice Kenne-
dy even acknowledged the Court’s rather remarkable change on this 
territoriality ruling: 
It is true that before today the Court has never held that non-
citizens detained by our Government in territory over which 
another country maintains de jure sovereignty have any 
rights under our Constitution.  But the cases before us lack 
any precise historical parallel.  They involve individuals de-
tained by executive order for the duration of a conflict that, if 
measured from September 11, 2001, to the present, is already 
among the longest wars in American history.  The detainees, 
moreover, are held in a territory that, while technically not 
part of the United States, is under the complete and total con-
trol of our Government.  Under these circumstances the lack 
of a precedent on point is no barrier to our holding.97 
Considering today’s globalization and the level of U.S. presence 
in international conflicts, this change from de jure to de facto sove-
reignty was appropriate.  As a policy matter, territorial sovereignty 
should not determine the reach of the Suspension Clause to foreign 
detention sites when the United States asserts such high levels of 
control over these facilities all around the world.  However, the 
change from de jure to de facto sovereignty has resulted in uncer-
  
exercise habeas jurisdiction over an alien detained at Guantanamo Bay.”) (internal 
quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also Sherman, supra note 35, at 208. 
 95. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 763. 
 96. Id. at 764. 
 97. Id. at 770–71 (internal citation omitted).  
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tainty and disconnect between the two Al Maqaleh courts in analyz-
ing and applying this standard to the Bagram detainees.  When ana-
lyzing the site of detention, the D.C. District Court held that the 
United States’ “high objective degree of control at Bagram” sup-
ported extending the Suspension Clause to the Bagram detainees.98  
The D.C. Circuit, on the other hand, held that the site of detention 
weighed “strongly” against extending the Suspension Clause to Ba-
gram because the detainees were apprehended abroad and the United 
States failed to exert as much control over Bagram as it did over 
Guantanamo Bay.99 
These polar-opposite holdings illustrate a disconnect that is ripe 
for Supreme Court review.  Al Maqaleh presents an opportunity for 
the Supreme Court to define an objective standard or principle on 
which to base the degree of control necessary to weigh in favor of 
extending the Suspension Clause extraterritorially.  While both 
courts in Al Maqaleh used the degree of U.S. control at Guantanamo 
Bay as the guiding principle on which to compare this factor, they 
reached opposite conclusions.100  The extraterritorial habeas 
precedent is fairly limited and recent, and Al Maqaleh illustrates the 
lower courts’ struggles in applying Boumediene’s site-of-detention 
analysis.  While Boumediene stressed using objective factors with 
practical concerns to evaluate the reach of the Suspension Clause,101 
courts are struggling to determine exactly what objective facts and 
practical concerns are relevant in this inquiry.  The Supreme Court 
must address how the “objective degree of control”102 is to be deter-
mined as well as the standard on which to base this determination 
and weigh in favor of, or against, extending the Suspension Clause 
protections. 
  
 98. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 226 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d, 605 F.3d 84 
(D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 99. Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d 84, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
100. Some of the disconnect in Al Maqaleh’s opposite holdings can be attributed 
to the district court’s decision to split up the factors and remove the site of appre-
hension from the court’s site-of-detention analysis, which the court of appeals 
found relevant and included in its analysis.  However, the courts’ determinations 
regarding the site of detention and level of U.S. control over Bagram clearly re-
main in conflict and deserve Supreme Court review. 
101. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008). 
102. Id. at 763. 
File: Nelson - Vol. 9, Iss. 2, V2 (updated; use this doc) Created on: 3/16/2011 9:38:00 PM Last Printed: 3/21/2011 10:19:00 AM 
2011 AL MAQALEH V. GATES 315 
2.  Multiple Factors Beyond Territorial Sovereignty 
The emergence of Boumediene’s multi-factor test also greatly af-
fects the role of territorial sovereignty in future detainee habeas cas-
es.  In Boumediene, for the first time the Supreme Court used a mul-
ti-factor, practical approach when analyzing the extraterritorial reach 
of the Suspension Clause.103  However, reasonable minds may differ 
in deciding whether Boumediene actually expanded or modified Ei-
sentrager’s historical standard and precedent.104  On the one hand, 
Boumediene merely clarified precedent already established in Eisen-
trager.  The majority in Boumediene analyzed extensive case law 
and found a “common thread” in history and precedent showing that 
“questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practic-
al concerns, not formalism.”105  To support this claim, Justice Ken-
nedy referenced the various practical factors—beyond just territorial 
sovereignty—that Eisentrager found relevant in denying the German 
nationals’ petitions for habeas relief.106 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court arguably greatly expanded 
and modified the standard for analyzing the extraterritorial reach of 
the Suspension Clause.  For instance, in Boumediene, Justice Ken-
nedy was mindful that the Supreme Court has been “careful not to 
foreclose the possibility that the protections of the Suspension 
Clause have expanded along with post-1789 developments that de-
fine the present scope of the writ,”107 indicating that the Court could 
expand the Suspension Clause protections after Eisentrager.  Justice 
Scalia, in his dissenting opinion, also attacked the multi-factor test as 
a complete departure from history and precedent established in Ei-
sentrager.108  Justice Scalia reiterated the predominance of territorial 
sovereignty when he stated “[l]est there be any doubt about the pri-
macy of territorial sovereignty in determining the jurisdiction of a 
  
103. See id. at 766. 
104. See Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 57, at 875 (discussing whether Eisen-
trager was decided on “purely territoriality and status grounds” or other, more 
practical factors). 
105. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764. 
106. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
107. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746 (emphasis added). 
108. See id. at 833–35 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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habeas court over an alien” and that “Eisentrager thus held . . . that 
the Constitution does not ensure habeas for aliens held by the United 
States in areas over which our Government is not sovereign.”109  In 
Al Maqaleh, the D.C. Circuit even stated that it “read Eisentrager as 
holding that constitutional habeas rights did not extend to any aliens 
who had never been in or brought into the sovereign territory of the 
United States.”110  Even the government’s chief argument in both 
Boumediene and Al Maqaleh was that detainees held beyond the 
U.S. borders have no constitutional habeas corpus rights.111  Today, 
the emergence of various factors, including the status-determination 
process, the site of apprehension and detention (with a focus on de 
facto sovereignty), and the practical obstacles in extending the Sus-
pension Clause has certainly diminished the role that territorial sove-
reignty will play in future detainee habeas cases.112 
So what role should territorial sovereignty play in future foreign 
detainee habeas cases?  Territorial sovereignty has maintained at 
least some presence in the current analysis.  For instance, the Bou-
mediene test is not required for a detainee held within U.S. sovereign 
territory.113  Territorial sovereignty also remains present in the 
second factor regarding the site of apprehension: apprehension 
beyond U.S. sovereign territory weighs against extending the Sus-
pension Clause to the detainee.114  However, the analysis on the site 
of detention has clearly shifted to focusing on, and analyzing, the 
objective degree of government control over the detention site and 
not whether the site of detention, or site of apprehension for that 
matter, is beyond U.S. sovereign territory.115  Thus, what once was a 
  
109. Id. at 835 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
110. Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d 84, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
111. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739; Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 210 
(D.D.C. 2009), rev’d, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
112. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766. 
113. Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 57, at 881. 
114. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768. 
115. See id. (discussing at length the Government’s control of Guantanamo Bay, 
stating that “[i]n every practical sense Guantanamo is not abroad; it is within the 
constant jurisdiction of the United States”); see also Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d 
at 221 (“The touchstone of the site of detention factor is the ‘objective degree of 
control’ the United States has over Bagram.”) (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 
754).  But see James Thornburg, Comment, Balancing Act in Black Robes: Extra-
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“touchstone” factor116 driving a court’s determination in foreign de-
tainee habeas cases has been greatly diminished.  In future detainee 
habeas cases, analyzing the objective degree of U.S. government 
control over a detention site, rather than whether the United States 
apprehended and held a detainee beyond its sovereign territory, 
would produce a more just and accurate result.  With today’s globa-
lized conflicts and high levels of U.S. presence and control over for-
eign detention sites, courts should question whether territorial sove-
reignty should play any role in future detainee habeas cases. 
B.  The Future of the Habeas Factors: Additional Factors and Un-
answered Questions 
Given the rather limited and young precedent on the extraterri-
torial reach of the Suspension Clause in detainee habeas cases, the 
future of the Boumediene factors is uncertain.  The multi-factor test 
was meant to be “detainee-specific” rather than a bright-line stan-
dard applied to every detainee.117  Thus, the future expects further 
litigation involving the application of Boumediene’s multi-factor test 
to Bagram and other foreign detention sites.  Al Maqaleh demon-
strates that Boumediene’s multi-factor test is not defined and, at a 
minimum, should encompass better guidance and additional factors.  
This section provides recommendations and discusses unanswered 
questions for future detainee habeas cases applying the Boumediene 
test: the need for additional factors, more guidance on the third, 
practical-obstacles factor, and weights that should be assigned to the 
“primary drivers.” 
1.  Additional Factors in Response to Today’s Conflicts 
Boumediene stated that “at least” three factors are relevant to de-
termining the extraterritorial reach of the Suspension Clause.118  The 
phrase “at least” indicates that Boumediene’s multi-factor test is not 
  
territorial Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction Beyond Boumediene, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 85, 
96 (2010) (arguing that the second factor only favors Suspension Clause extension 
when the site of detention is within the sovereign territory of the United States). 
116. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 755. 
117. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 215. 
118. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766. 
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exclusive or foreclosed from modification.  As international conflicts 
develop in the future, the military mission, international law, and the 
laws of war are certain to adapt to these changes.  Boumediene’s 
three-factor habeas analysis is certain to adapt as well. 
a.  Length of Confinement Without Adequate Status Review 
Al Maqaleh presents an opportunity for the Supreme Court to 
add an additional practical factor to the Boumediene test: the detai-
nee’s length of confinement without adequate status review.119  
While Boumediene failed to include this factor as part of its habeas 
test, the Supreme Court was mindful that the Guantanamo Bay de-
tainees spent six years in confinement without any adequate status 
review:  
The gravity of the separation-of-powers issues raised by 
these cases and the fact that these detainees have been denied 
meaningful access to a judicial forum for a period of years 
render these cases exceptional.120 
. . . . 
In some of these cases six years have elapsed without the 
judicial oversight that habeas corpus or an adequate substi-
tute demands.  And there has been no showing that the Ex-
ecutive faces such onerous burdens that it cannot respond to 
habeas corpus actions.121 
The district court in Al Maqaleh even went so far as to claim that 
the length of detainee detention without adequate status review is 
already an additional factor to be analyzed in the multi-factor test.122  
Yet, when the D.C. Circuit reversed, it made no mention of the de-
tainees’ length of confinement.  With the right to habeas corpus con-
sidered by the Supreme Court as one of the “few safeguards of liber-
ty,”123 length of confinement without adequate status review should 
  
119. See id. at 799–800 (Souter, J., concurring); Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 
216. 
120. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 772. 
121. Id. at 794. 
122. See Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 216. 
123. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 745. 
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encompass a stand-alone factor in today’s extraterritorial habeas 
analysis.  This additional factor would actually represent precisely 
what the right to habeas corpus is meant to protect: indefinite execu-
tive detention without adequate process and review determinations 
by a detached judicial officer.124 
With occupation at Bagram now many years and likely to extend 
further into the future, courts should recognize the inherent risk in 
indefinite detention without adequate status review procedures.  
While there is no U.S. intention to occupy Bagram with “perma-
nence,”125 the intent is to remain at Bagram until military operations 
have concluded.126  And every indication is that the current hostili-
ties will not come to any formal completion soon.127  The district 
court in Al Maqaleh recognized this problem, stating that the United 
States’ “promise may be no more than a distant hope given the inde-
finite nature of our global efforts against terrorism.”128  Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court has recognized the right to habeas corpus as the 
“surest safeguard of liberty.”129  Under the circumstances with Iraq 
and Afghanistan, unreasonable executive detention until all hostili-
ties have ended also runs contrary to America’s fundamental prin-
ciples of freedom, democracy, and basic rights and liberties.  This 
right deserves an extension to those individuals detained by the U.S. 
executive branch for unreasonable periods without adequate status 
review. 
b.  Executive Manipulation 
A second factor that deserves inclusion into the Boumediene test 
would analyze whether the executive branch transferred the detainee 
  
124. See id. 
125. Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d 84, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
126. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 224–25 (citing Press Release, The White 
House, Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership, 
THE WHITE HOUSE (May 23, 2005), available at http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/ 
afghanistan/WH/20050523-2.pdf).  
127. See, e.g., Heidi Vogt, NATO: Combat Role in Afghanistan Could Pass 2014, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2010/11/17/nato-combat-role-in-afgha_n_784680.html. 
128. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 225. 
129. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 745. 
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into an active theater of war following apprehension.  This factor 
would guard against potential executive manipulation by transferring 
detainees into an active theater of war, thereby distorting Boume-
diene’s third factor—practical obstacles in extending the Suspension 
Clause.  Interestingly, the D.C. Circuit in Al Maqaleh even invited 
the Supreme Court to modify the three-factor test by adding “mani-
pulation by the Executive.”130 
Maintaining the current three-factor test risks executive manipu-
lation by transferring detainees beyond the reach of the Suspension 
Clause.  In Boumediene, Justice Kennedy briefly noted that, had 
Guantanamo Bay been located within an active theater of war, the 
practical obstacles would weigh against extending the Suspension 
Clause protections to the detainees.131  In Al Maqaleh, all four Ba-
gram detainees were allegedly captured beyond Afghanistan and 
later transferred into the Afghanistan theater.132  Relying on Justice 
Kennedy’s statement in Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit held that the 
third factor weighed “overwhelmingly” in favor of not extending the 
Suspension Clause to the Bagram detainees because Bagram re-
mained in an active theater of war.133  Thus, once the government 
transfers a detainee into an active theater, the practical-obstacles fac-
tor, considered a “primary driver” under the habeas test,134 is greatly 
affected. 
2.  Unanswered Questions 
Granted, a multi-factor balancing test only begs for arbitrary ap-
plications and rulings.135  Illustrated by the conflicting outcomes in 
Al Maqaleh, unanswered questions remain as to how the Boume-
diene factors should be applied.  The first is whether the Supreme 
Court should adopt the D.C. District Court’s assignment of weights 
to the “primary drivers” under the current detainee habeas analy-
  
130. Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 99. 
131. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770. 
132. See Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 209. 
133. Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 97. 
134. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 218. 
135. See Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 57, at 887 (discussing the risk in analyz-
ing the functional test in a “theoretical vacuum” that would lead to applying the 
writ “random or even unprincipled”).  
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sis.136  The Supreme Court was not clear in Boumediene whether 
certain weight, or equal weight, should be given to each factor.  The 
D.C. District Court correctly pointed out, though, that three of the 
actual six factors—site of detention, adequacy of the process, and 
practical obstacles—clearly drove the Court’s analysis in Boume-
diene.137  Thus, the district court assigned these three factors as the 
“primary drivers” in the Boumediene analysis.138  Arguably, the 
three “primary drivers” encompass precisely what the writ of habeas 
corpus is meant to protect: unreasonable executive detention without 
adequate process and status review.  Thus, the Supreme Court should 
carefully consider modifying the Boumediene test to accurately re-
flect the writ’s purpose. 
Second, courts have focused heavily on the adequacy of the 
process afforded to detainees, but have failed to answer exactly how 
much process is considered “adequate” under today’s Boumediene 
test.  In both Boumediene and Al Maqaleh, the procedures were 
found to be inadequate substitutes for habeas corpus protections.139  
Without delving into particular process characteristics afforded in 
the Combatant Status Review Tribunals and the Unlawful Enemy 
Combatant Review Board at Guantanamo Bay and Bagram, respec-
tively, the procedures lacked one clear process demand: review by a 
detached judicial officer.140  Furthermore, the seemingly broad defi-
nition of “enemy combatant” used for status determinations in Afg-
hanistan and Iraq reflects the need for an objective, guiding principle 
or standard to analyze exactly what process would be considered an 
“adequate” habeas substitute in current and future status determina-
tions.141 
But how much process should be considered “adequate” under 
today’s habeas test?  The courts have not answered this question, and 
  
136. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 218. 
137. Id. 
138. Id.  
139. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 790–92 (2008); Al Maqaleh II, 605 
F.3d 84, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
140. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 786 (“For the writ of habeas corpus, or its subs-
titute, to function as an effective and proper remedy in this context, the court that 
conducts the habeas proceeding must have the means to correct errors that oc-
curred during the CSRT proceedings.”). 
141. See Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 219. 
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it is beyond the scope of this Note to answer.142  The Boumediene 
Court was even mindful to not state that the Guantanamo Bay detai-
nees were entitled to guaranteed constitutional due process.  Even 
the D.C. District Court in Al Maqaleh brushed over this issue when 
it stated that “[t]his court need not determine how extensive process 
must be to stave off the reach of the Suspension Clause to Ba-
gram.”143  However, having an objective standard or principle by 
which to determine what is adequate process under the Boumediene 
test would allow military commanders and executive branch officials 
to formulate and implement satisfactory policies in future conflicts. 
C.  Guidance on the Practical Obstacles 
Lastly, Al Maqaleh presents another opportunity for the Supreme 
Court to provide further guidance on the practical-obstacles factor.  
As mentioned earlier, the inherent deficiency of a multi-factored, 
functional test is its arbitrary and unequal application.144  The Bou-
mediene Court’s deficient guidance on the practical-obstacles factor 
only exacerbates this problem.  Unquestionably, deference to the 
President and military leaders regarding decisions on military neces-
sity, operations in an active theater of war, and reasonable detention 
of enemy combatants should not be circumvented.  However, ques-
tions remain regarding the risk of executive manipulation of the 
Boumediene test.145  For instance, one question is the effect on the 
practical-obstacles analysis when a detainee is captured beyond an 
active theater of war and later transported into an active theater for 
detention.  This scenario played out in Al Maqaleh.  In our current 
“Global War on Terrorism,” another lingering question is the actual 
  
142. For a discussion on the “adequate process” needed to support substituting 
habeas protection, see Michael J. Buxton, Note, No Habeas For You! Al Maqaleh 
v. Gates, the Bagram Detainees, and the Global Insurgency, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 
519, 530–33 (2010); Saxby Chambliss, The Future of Detainees in the Global War 
on Terror: A U.S. Policy Perspective, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 821, 835–40 (2009).    
143. Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 227. 
144. See Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 57, at 887 (discussing the risk in analyz-
ing the functional test in a “theoretical vacuum” that would lead to applying the 
writ “random or even unprincipled”). 
145. See Davis, supra note 15, at 1224–26 (discussing problems associated with 
the practical-obstacles factor).  
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boundaries of an active theater of war.146  A detainee should not be 
denied Suspension Clause protections because the government 
transported him into an active theater where the Suspension Clause 
would arguably not reach.  Furthermore, another question is the ef-
fect of military necessity and the military mission on the practical-
obstacles factor.  These questions require that a delicate and fine line 
be drawn.  On one hand are the surest safeguards of liberty and the 
separation of powers check on the executive.147  On the other hand is 
the importance of the military mission and executive deference in 
international conflict policy decisions. 
The answer to these questions must include some level of defe-
rence to the legitimate needs of the armed forces in advancing the 
military mission148 but also address the pertinent constitutional is-
sues that cannot be overlooked.  Safe to say, the writ of habeas cor-
pus is one of these pertinent constitutional issues.  However, as the 
Boumediene Court recognized, the executive branch is entitled to a 
“reasonable period of time” before a court will entertain a habeas 
corpus petition from a detainee.149  This reasonable period of time is 
necessary to allow the military to screen and review the detainee and 
determine the detainee’s combatant status.150  This balance between 
the military mission and an individual’s surest safeguard of liberty 
will allow the courts to maintain a practical, functional, and detai-
nee-by-detainee, detention-site-by-detention-site application of the 
habeas test that the Boumediene Court envisioned. 
  
146. See generally Buxton, supra note 142, at 524–29 (discussing the effect of 
global insurgency on habeas jurisprudence).  
147. See Davis, supra note 15, at 1204–05. 
148. This is related to the “military deference doctrine,” where courts routinely 
defer to military administrative and operational decisions.  See John F. O’Connor, 
The Origins and Application of the Military Deference Doctrine, 35 GA. L. REV. 
161, 165–66 (2000); Phillip Carter, Judicial Deference to Military May Affect Gay 
Rights, War on Terror, CNN (July 15, 2003), http://www.cnn.com/2003/ 
LAW/07/15/findlaw.analysis.carter.security. 
149. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 793–94 (2008).  
150. See id. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Over time, technology, globalization, and the media have greatly 
impacted the laws of war and how wars are fought.151  Conflicts are 
no longer fought on a single front, but rather on a global front, both 
internationally and domestically.152  The enemy is no longer a rec-
ognized and uniformed nation, but rather terrorist cells or groups 
stationed all around the world.153  Thus, the laws of every nation, 
principles of international law, and the laws of warfare must evolve 
and adapt to these changing dynamics in armed conflict.154  The 
Suspension Clause jurisprudence has evidently evolved during the 
most recent international armed conflict.  Al Maqaleh illustrates how 
territorial sovereignty is no longer the driving factor in today’s extra-
territorial habeas analysis.  Additionally, the Boumediene factors are 
in need of further evolution.  This Note attempted to highlight some 
of these needed changes as well as address some unanswered ques-
tions for the Supreme Court to consider.  One thing certain, however, 
is that unreasonable executive detention without adequate status re-
views from a detached judicial officer is simply not the answer. 
Currently, the United States is constructing a new forty-acre 
prison at Bagram Air Base, set to house hundreds of additional de-
tainees.155  Uncertainty exists today whether military commissions, 
federal courts, or another venue will serve to prosecute accused ter-
  
151. See, e.g., BRUCE BERKOWITZ, THE NEW FACE OF WAR: HOW WAR WILL BE 
FOUGHT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, 1–9 (2007) (discussing information technology’s 
impact on war fighting); Jennifer Barrett, Live From Iraq, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 26, 
2003, http://www.newsweek.com/2003/03/25/live-from-iraq.html# (discussing the 
media’s evolution of war coverage).  
152. See Jason Rineheart, Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency, PERSP. ON 
TERRORISM, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine 
&view=article&id=138 (“After 9/11, Al-Qaeda’s network across national borders 
was characterized by many as a global insurgency.  This new insurgency threat 
was not only local, it was international, which as some argue, requires a re-
thinking of how such irregular warfare should be combated.”). 
153. See id. 
154. See John B. Bellinger, III, Terrorism and Changes to the Laws of War, 20 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 331, 335–37 (2010) (discussing the inherent problem in 
traditional armed conflict in the post-9/11 war fighting).  
155. Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 57, at 857. 
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rorist detainees.156  As more detainees are housed at Bagram and 
new conflicts emerge in the future, issues regarding detainee rights 
will not go away.  In his dissenting opinion in Eisentrager, Justice 
Black provided a possible solution to some of today’s struggles over 
detainee rights.157  At the time considered a far-reaching solution, 
Justice Black proposed that constitutional habeas corpus rights need 
not be judged upon an alien’s identity with the United States, or even 
physical presence on U.S. territory, but rather that constitutional ha-
beas corpus protections should extend to “all persons coming within 
the ambit of our power.”158  In today’s globalized world with ongo-
ing international conflicts and U.S. presence, Justice Black’s solu-
tion may not seem so far-reaching after all.  
 
  
156. See Daphne Eviatar, Detainee Task Force Recommends Reformed Military 
Commissions to Try Some Gitmo Detainees, WASH. INDEP. (July 21, 2009), 
http://washingtonindependent.com/51889/detainee-task-force-recommends-
reformed-military-commissions-to-try-some-gitmo-detainees. 
157. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting). 
158. Id. 
